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 Online users often need to make adoption decisions without
 accurate information about the product values. An informa
 tional cascade occurs when it is optimal for an online user,
 having observed others ' actions, to follow the adoption deci
 Carol Saunders was the accepting senior editor for this paper.
 sion of the preceding individual without regard to his own
 information. Informational cascades are often rational for
 individual decision making; however, it may lead to adoption
 of inferior products. With easy availability of information
 about other users ' choices, the Internet offers an ideal envi
 ronment for informational cascades. In this paper, we empi
 rically examine informational cascades in the context of
 online software adoption. We find user behavior in adopting
 software products is consistent with the predictions of the
 informational cascades literature. Our results demonstrate
 that online users ' choices of software products exhibit distinct
 jumps and drops with changes in download ranking, as
 predicted by informational cascades theory. Furthermore, we
 find that user reviews have no impact on user adoption of the
 most popular product, while having an increasingly positive
 impact on the adoption of lower ranking products. The
 phenomenon persists after controllingfor alternative explana
 tions such as network effects, word-of-mouth effects, and
 product diffusion. Our results validate informational cas
 cades as an important driver for decision making on the
 Internet. The finding also offers an explanation for the mixed
 results reported in prior studies with regard to the influence
 of online user reviews on product sales. We show that the
 mixed results could be due to the moderating effect of infor
 mational cascades.
 Keywords: E-commerce, herding, informational cascades,
 decision making, network effects, word-of-mouth, software
 download, online communities, online user review
 Introduction
 As asserted by Eric Hoffer (1955), "When people are free to
 do as they please, they usually imitate each other." This leads
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 to what is called herd behavior, that is, everyone is doing
 what everyone else is doing (Banerjee 1992). Herding por
 trays various social and economic situations where an indi
 vidual's or organization's decision making is markedly
 influenced by the decisions of others, such as in financial
 investment, technology adoption, firms' strategic decisions,
 political voting, and dining and fashion trends. For instance,
 when there are two restaurants next to each other, people
 often pick the one with more seats occupied; or despite
 mediocre reviews, a New York Times bestseller can sell well
 enough to continue as a bestseller (Bikhchandani et al. 1998).
 While herding describes a phenomenon in which individuals
 converge to a uniform social behavior (Bikhchandani et al.
 1998), extant research has suggested a variety of mechanisms
 underlying such observations of convergent behavior among
 decision makers (Bikhchandani et al. 1992). Informational
 cascades, sanctions on deviants, positive payoff externalities,
 and conformity preference have been suggested as the pri
 mary mechanisms for herd behavior (Bikhchandani et al.
 1992).
 Herd behavior is particularly prominent in the information
 technology industry. IT managers are known to follow each
 other in making IT investment decisions (Kauffman and Li
 2003), and computer users often adopt popular software
 products, thus making them even more popular (Brynjolfsson
 and Kemerer 1996; Gandal 1994). The primary explanation
 provided in the extant literature for the observation of herd
 behavior in the IT industry is network effects, a form of posi
 tive payoff externalities.2 Network effects refer to the idea
 that a product becomes more valuable as its user base expands
 (Katz and Shapiro 1994). For example, the value of an elec
 tronic payment system to a commercial bank increases with
 the number of banks that adopt the same system (Gowrisan
 karan and Stavins 2004). However, many researchers have
 argued that the significant network effects expected by aca
 demic researchers in the IT industry often fail to materialize
 (Liebowitz 2002). Even for products with network effects,
 there is often a limit as to the network size. For instance, it is
 well-known that peer-to-peer networks benefit from user
 participation, but too many users lead to network congestion
 and limit network effects on the margin (Asvanund et al.
 2004). In such cases, a large network does not necessarily
 provide more value to potential adopters.
 The concerns about the strength and existence of network
 effects in the IT industry require a fresh look at alternative
 causes of herd behavior. In this paper, we explore another
 major driver: informational cascades (Banerjee 1992;
 Bikhchandani et al. 1992; Li 2004). Informational cascades
 refer to the situation "when it is optimal for an individual,
 having observed the actions of those ahead of him, to follow
 the behavior of the preceding individual without regard to his
 own information" (Bikhchandani et al. 1992, p. 994). Such a
 situation arises when decision makers have imperfect knowl
 edge of the true value of a product so they infer its utility from
 observing actions of their predecessors. The influence of
 others' behavior could be so substantial that it dominates the
 influence of decision makers' own information. In this case,
 decision makers would imitate their predecessors without
 regard to their own information. Informational cascades are
 largely informational in nature (Berndt et al. 2003). As a
 result, despite the availability of close substitutes, informa
 tional cascades may lead to the dominance of one product or
 technology over another and sometimes may lead to the rejec
 tion of more efficient technologies (Abrahamson 1991).
 Thus, informational cascades offer an information-based
 explanation for the herd behavior (Bikhchandani et al. 1992;
 Bikhchandani and Sharma 2001; Li 2004), suggesting that
 individuals with noisy information may rationally ignore their
 own information and choose to follow the crowd.
 Informational cascades could be particularly prominent on the
 Internet for two reasons. First, the vast amount of information
 available on the Web has created information overload among
 online users (Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000; Jones et al. 2004;
 Shapiro and Varian 1999). In particular, products ranging
 from software to electronics have become increasingly sophis
 ticated, and assessment of their value and features often
 requires extensive knowledge about the products (Bakos
 1991). Moreover, the number of competing products in each
 product category has grown exponentially as a result of the
 Internet's reach and the virtually unlimited shelf space of
 online retailers. Online shoppers often find that they lack the
 knowledge and time to make the optimal purchase decision
 out of dozens and sometimes hundreds of sophisticated com
 peting products. In such cases, following others' choices
 could be the most efficient and rational way to make deci
 sions, as suggested by the informational cascades theory.
 2Network effects and network externalities are often used interchangeably in
 the literature (Katz and Shapiro 1994). However, Liebowitz and Margolis
 (1994) pointed out that network effects are a much broader concept than
 network externalities. Network effects refer to the general phenomenon that
 "the benefit or surplus that an agent derives from a good [changes] when the
 number of other agents consuming the same kind of good changes" (Katz and
 Shapiro 1985). The term network externalities, however, refers to a specific
 kind of network effects where "participants in the market fail to internalize
 these effects" (Liebowitz and Margolis 1994). That is, network externalities
 occur when market participants do not take the impact of their adoption
 decisions on others into consideration when they make the decisions. In this
 case, the market equilibrium is no longer socially optimal, and external
 intervention could be necessary. Liebowitz and Margolis noted that, in many
 cases, network effects do not lead to network externalities. This is because
 the owners of networks usually internalize the network effects by subsidizing
 initial adoptions. In networks without owners, coordination among network
 participants (e.g., industry standardization) can internalize the network effect.
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 Second, the Internet and other digital channels provide much
 more information about other online users' choices and
 product popularity, therefore making informational cascades
 more feasible. Many online e-commerce websites display
 products according to their popularity, ranking items based on
 their previous sales performance. Amazon.com provides a
 top sellers list and posts each product's sales ranking.
 Software products listed at CNET Download.com are labeled
 as popular when the total number of downloads reaches top
 50 in the previous week. Such popularity information is an
 indicator of the choices made by earlier adopters. The
 prevalence of popularity information on the Internet may
 drown out an online user's private value assessment and make
 her more prone to imitate earlier adopters' decisions. This
 allows informational cascades to start faster and to expand to
 a larger population (Bikhchandani et al. 1998). While
 informational cascades have often been observed in local
 environments (Bikhchandani et al. 1992), the pervasive use of
 the Internet and other information technologies extends their
 influence to the global stage.
 The objective of this paper is to empirically examine the
 impact of informational cascades on product adoption on the
 Internet. A key empirical challenge in identifying the influ
 ence of informational cascades is to differentiate it from alter
 native factors that lead to herd behavior such as network
 effects, word-of-mouth (WOM) effects, and product diffusion.
 We address the challenge by noting two unique implications
 for informational cascades. First, alternative explanations
 predict that adoption increases with the number of previous
 adoptions, while informational cascades theory indicates that
 product adoption experiences distinctive leaps and drops with
 changes in popularity as measured by product adoption
 ranking. This distinction allows us to identify informational
 cascades when controlling for alternative explanations.
 Second, informational cascades suggest decision makers
 ignore information when following the crowds for popular
 products, but not when they adopt less popular products.
 Consistent with the predictions of the informational cascades
 literature, we find changes in product popularity indeed lead
 to distinctive leaps and drops in online users' software
 choices after controlling for network effects, WOM effects,
 and product diffusion. We also find user rating has no impact
 on user adoption of popular products, but its influence
 becomes significant for the adoption of less popular products.
 The influence consistently occurs in all eight software
 categories we studied. Our results indicate that informational
 cascades play a significant role in online users' decision
 making. The finding that user rating has an increasingly
 positive impact on less popular products also indicates that
 informational cascades moderate the influence of online user
 reviews. It provides a new explanation for the mixed results
 reported in prior studies, which often assume a uniform
 impact of online user reviews on product sales.
 This paper adds to the IS research by offering a new perspec
 tive on the impact of information provided by the Internet on
 adoption decisions (Biros et al. 2002). The results have signi
 ficant implications for designing customer-centric websites
 (Albert et al. 2004; Bapna et al. 2004) and devising business
 strategies for IT firms and online retailers. Traditionally
 during system design and analysis, more attention has been
 paid to user requirements and user acceptance, and less
 emphasis has been put on understanding how these design
 characteristics affect user behavior. This emphasis has been
 common because most IT systems are designed to meet speci
 fic technical requirements. However, as Hong et al. (2002)
 noted, a customer-centric website is not only an information
 system, but also a profit-generating channel. In this case, a
 deeper understanding of the relationship between design
 features, particularly product information features, and user
 behavior is important for the success of the websites (Palmer
 2002). Our results indicate that design features providing
 product rankings have significant influence on online users'
 adoption decisions.
 Our findings also suggest that for IT businesses to be success
 ful, being superior in technology is not sufficient. As new
 technologies are constantly introduced to individual users and
 businesses, the market is overwhelmed with IT products, and
 users and businesses have neither the time nor the information
 to make well-informed adoption decisions. This provides a
 perfect environment for informational cascades, which may
 lead to the rejection of technically superior products. IT
 businesses need to take informational cascades into considera
 tion when devising business strategies for their products.
 These strategies involve obtaining an early lead in product
 adoption and using product information strategically to influ
 ence informational cascades.
 Our findings also suggest the abundance of online information
 does not necessarily benefit consumers. Informational cas
 cades are known to generate suboptimal social allocation
 (Bikhchandani et al. 1998). By providing easily available
 product ranking information that enables informational
 cascades, the Internet may decrease rather than increase
 consumer welfare.
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We discuss the
 related literature and research hypotheses, respectively, in the
 following two sections. We then describe the data, and
 develop and analyze the empirical model. In the last section,
 we discuss the results and implications, and conclude the
 paper by addressing the limitations and identifying areas for
 future research.
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 Literature Review
 The herding phenomenon has been widely observed in a
 variety of fields. Welch (1992) examined herd behavior in
 the market of initial public offering and found that investors
 mimic previous investors, regardless of their own substantive
 private information. Hirschleifer et al. (1994) found that
 herding influences not only investment choices, but also
 investors' decisions in acquiring information. Under some
 conditions, an investor will find it optimal to collect infor
 mation about stocks that are followed by many investors.
 Bikhchandani et al. (2001) provided a comprehensive review
 of the recent theoretical and empirical research on herd
 behavior in financial markets. Herding is also observed
 beyond financial markets. Borenstein and Netz (1999) found
 that increased competition among airlines leads to even
 greater similarities in airline departure times. Kennedy (2002)
 indicated that, even though imitative introduction, on average,
 unde erforms differentiated introduction, major television
 networks copy each other when introducing new programs.
 Simonsohn and Ariely (2004) tested their prediction of herd
 behavior in eBay's online auction. They found that bidders
 often engage in herd behavior in favoring auctions with more
 existing bids. Their results suggested that bidders interpret
 the number of existing bids as an informative signal of
 quality, even when the higher number of bids is simply caused
 by a lower starting price.
 Herd behavior has also been observed in many cases of IT
 adoption in which investment decision makers follow the
 decisions of earlier adopters (Kauffman and Li 2003;
 Swanson and Ramiller 2004). Previous research has often
 attributed such imitative behavior to network effects (Au and
 Kauffman 2001 ; Gallaugher and Wang 2002; Kauffman et al.
 2000). Network effects arise when adopters' payoff is
 increased by following the majority in adopting technology
 innovations (Katz and Shapiro 1985; Shapiro and Varian
 1999). Network effects are expected to be prominent in many
 technology innovations. However, much imitative herd
 behavior in IT adoption and e-commerce cannot be single
 handedly explained by network effects. Liebowitz (2002)
 noted that many e-commerce products do not even have the
 slightest trace of network effects. Li (2005) showed that
 bogus network effects can be stimulated through "cheap talk"
 and information asymmetry among different parties in a
 technology distribution channel.
 One seminal contribution to the theoretical herding research
 is the development of informational cascades theory, which is
 a social learning mechanism introduced by Banerjee (1992)
 and Bikhchandani et al. (1992). In the framework for this
 theory, a sequence of individuals makes decisions with
 incomplete and asymmetric information. Individuals' infor
 mation is private and inaccurate. Besides their own informa
 tion, they also observe their predecessors' actions, although
 they do not observe their predecessors' decision-making
 process or relevant information used. Given their imperfect
 knowledge, sequential decision makers infer product values
 from the actions of their predecessors in combination with
 their private information. However, if consecutive prede
 cessors choose a particular product, their influence on the
 following decision makers could be so strong that the prede
 cessors are imitated regardless of private information.
 Bikhchandani et al. (1992) named the process informational
 cascades. Informational cascades are a special case of herd
 behavior. An informational cascade occurs when individuals
 ignore their private information when making a decision,
 whereas herd behavior takes place when all of the individuals
 make an identical decision, although they do not necessarily
 ignore their private information (Smith and Sorensen 2000).
 Informational cascades theory has often been recognized as
 the force behind observed herd behavior in an individual's or
 organization's decision making (Bikhchandani et al. 2001).
 Golder and Tellis (2004) showed that the impact of informa
 tional cascades is critical to the diffusion process in a product
 life cycle. Berndt et al. (2003) demonstrated that the extern
 alities arising from informational cascades significantly
 influenced the diffusion rate and market share of antiulcer
 drugs in the pharmaceutical market. Furthermore, Terlaak
 and King (2006) used the informational cascades theory as the
 foundation to test the bandwagon effect in adopting the ISO
 9000 quality management standard.
 A few recent information systems studies considered the
 influence of informational cascades in IT adoption. Waiden
 and Browne (2002) suggested that informational cascades
 play a significant role in influencing firms' adoption of elec
 tronic commerce technologies. Kauffman and Li (2003) pro
 posed a theoretical framework for the herd behavior observed
 in IT adoption. They identified informational cascades theory
 as a new perspective to explain the dynamics of IT adoption.
 Li (2004), taking an explorative approach, focused on
 examining the influence of informational cascades in IT
 adoption and the business implications. He also explored
 various scenarios in IT adoption, in which informational
 cascades may interact with other mechanisms such as network
 effects and WOM effects. Konana and Balasubramanian
 (2005) referred to informational cascades theory in devel
 oping a social-economic-psychological model to predict
 technology adoption of online banking. Informational cas
 cades theory is also associated with the institutional theory of
 mimetic isomorphism, where institutions are observed to
 imitate one another in technology decision making (DiMaggio
 26 MIS Quarterly Vol. 33 No. 1/March 2009
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 and Powell 1983; Swanson and Ramiller 2004; Tingling and
 Parent 2003). Both theories share the characteristics of peer
 influences and uncertainty in the decision-making process.
 Complementing this line of IS research, we empirically ex
 plore informational cascades among online users and examine
 how online product information influences informational
 cascades. We differentiate our study on two fronts. First, we
 take the initial step to analyze herd behavior on the Internet,
 which, to our knowledge, has not been explored before.
 Second, the myriad of factors that lead to herd behavior have
 presented challenges to business practitioners. Without
 knowing the exact causes of herd behavior, businesses have
 difficulty in exploiting the opportunities or addressing the
 challenges presented by the mass herd behavior commonly
 observed. This is especially challenging for IT firms where
 informational cascades often intertwine with network effects,
 WOM effects, and other mechanisms in creating herd
 behavior. The objective of this paper is, therefore, to take a
 first step in addressing this challenge by identifying and
 measuring one key driver of herd behavior?informational
 cascades?and differentiating it from other drivers.
 Research Hypotheses HBHHHi
 Research Context
 Our empirical study is conducted in the context of software
 downloading at CNET Download.com (CNETD). CNETD
 presents an ideal environment for this study. All software
 programs listed on CNETD can be downloaded without
 charge; thus, the price effect on demand is controlled by
 default. In any software category, users are presented with a
 wide array of choices. In addition to the description of
 product features, two other types of product information are
 available on CNETD: information on previous users' choices
 and information on product evaluation. For information on
 previous users' choices, CNETD updates the cumulative
 number of downloads for each software program every day.
 It also reports the number of downloads for the most recent
 week. As to information on product evaluation, CNETD
 actively solicits user reviews for all programs and provides
 professional editor reviews on a small number (less than 10
 percent) of the software programs. Visitors to CNETD can
 sort software on any of the attributes mentioned above.
 CNETD reports that the attribute sorted most often is number
 of downloads, which provides relative ranking of software
 downloads in a category. Figure 1 presents a screen shot of
 a typical product listing page on CNETD. The presence of
 both types of product information is not unique to CNETD.
 Many online e-commerce websites (e.g., Amazon.com and
 CircuitCity.com) offer similar ranking and rating information
 for individual products. By analyzing how the two types of
 information and their interactions affect online users'
 adoption decisions, we can identify informational cascades
 behavior.
 Informational Cascades
 Informational cascades theory considers a common phenom
 enon where a decision maker chooses among multiple com
 peting products. The decision maker has two sources of
 information. One is her own information based on her knowl
 edge of the products or her reading about the products. This
 information is often limited or imperfect, thus she is uncertain
 of true product values. The other is the information derived
 from the adoption decisions of others. The decision maker
 combines the two sources of information to make the best
 decision. The influence of each source of information
 depends on its relative strength. If the decision maker's own
 information is very limited, she puts more weight on the
 information derived from observation of others' actions. If
 the decision maker is very knowledgeable about the products,
 the weight placed on others' decisions diminishes. The two
 sources of information may present conflicting signals from
 time to time and, when this happens, the decision maker
 follows the information source with more weight. An infor
 mational cascade arises when the influence of others'
 decisions outweighs the influence of the decision maker's
 own information, so that "an individual's action does not
 depend on his private information signal" (Bikchandani et al.
 1992, p. 1000). In this case, the decision maker simply
 follows her predecessors' decisions regardless of her private
 information. This in turn leads to following by subsequent
 decision makers, making them adopt the same product with
 increasing momentum (Banerjee 1992; Bikhchandani et al.
 1992). For example, in a simple setting in which customers
 make choices between two qualitatively equivalent products,
 it can be shown that a cascade will take place quickly when
 there have been two or more consecutive decisions of one
 "choice" over the other.3
 The underlying message of informational cascades is that
 when people are making decisions based on their own infor
 mation and their observation of others' actions, the influence
 of others' actions could be so substantial that it dominates the
 influence of their own information (Bikhchandani et al. 1992;
 Golder and Tellis 2004). Two key factors drive informational
 3See Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani et al. (1992), and Chamley (2004) for
 the proof of informational cascades models of two or more products.
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 Figure 1. Screen Shot of Product Listing Page
 cascades: uncertainty in decision makers' own information
 and their ability to observe predecessors' decisions (Bikh
 chandani et al. 1992). Software downloading sites provide an
 excellent context for the study of informational cascades.
 Software is a typical form of experience goods where adopters
 face significant uncertainty in assessing values. Moreover,
 hundreds of software downloads are available for the same
 type of application, which further limits users' ability to
 assess features and values. To help online users make deci
 sions, software downloading sites provide information on
 each software program's download counts and its ranking
 within each category. As predicted in informational cascades
 literature, such information represents recent adopters'
 choices and can significantly influence the followers' decision
 making, especially when online users have limited informa
 tion about product value and usability.
 Informational cascades theory has a number of unique impli
 cations. First, it leads to a dramatic and distinctive change in
 the product adoption process. Before the start of informa
 tional cascades, adoption decisions are influenced by both
 private information and predecessors' decisions. The adop
 tion process is gradual and noisy, but the process changes
 dramatically after the onset of informational cascades. Since
 individuals follow the behavior of their predecessors without
 regard to their own information, informational cascades lead
 to a sudden jump in the adoption process. Graphically, the
 Start of an informational cascade represents a tipping point
 where a gradual adoption process turns into frenzy (Bernt et
 al. 2003; Golder and Tellis 2003; Welch 1992).
 The above discussion suggests that one of the distinctive
 characteristics of informational cascades is the presence of
 significant jumps in product adoption. In the extreme case, if
 none of the subsequent decision makers has better informa
 tion, informational cascades will not stop once started and all
 of the later decision makers will adopt the same product
 (Bikhchandani et al. 1992). In reality, informational cascades
 do not last forever (Bikhchandani et al. 1998). The arrival of
 new information or more informed decision makers can stop
 informational cascades.
 The jump in product adoption is triggered when the relative
 popularity (i.e., the sales ranking or download ranking in our
 context) of one product surpasses another. Consider a simple
 model where customers make sequential choices between two
 products, A and B.4 Both products are of the same price, but
 one product is of higher quality than the other. Customers
 have no ex ante information about product quality, therefore
 both products are equally desirable to customers. Now as
 sume that before each customer makes the purchase decision,
 4This example is adapted from Bikhchandani et al. (1998).
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 she obtains a noisy signal with a probability p> 0.5 that the
 signal reveals the true identity of the product with higher
 quality. The probability (i.e., the strength of the signal) is
 the same across all customers. In this case, the first customer
 will choose the product based solely on her own signal. The
 second customer observes his own signal, but he can also
 infer the first customer's signal from her action. If both of the
 signals suggest the same product, the decision is straight
 forward. If the signals are in conflict, the second customer
 would be indifferent between the two products, since the
 strengths of the signals are the same. His choice will be
 determined by a random draw. The third customer's decision
 depends on the actions of the previous two customers. If both
 customers choose the same product, say A9 the third customer
 infers that the first customer received a signal for A and the
 second customer is also likely to have received a signal for A.
 In this case, she will choose A regardless of her own signal,
 marking the beginning of informational cascades. To put it
 differently, A9 s dominating market share provides a strong
 signal of A ' s superiority over the other product, which triggers
 informational cascades. The aforementioned discussion
 shows that the observed relative popularity of the two
 products determines the timing and direction of informational
 cascades. When the popularity of one product outweighs the
 other, it sends a strong signal to later customers, and the
 signal dominates their own information.
 It is important to note that popularity in the above discussion
 refers to the relative ranking of the two products rather than
 absolute sales. Once the popularity of one product exceeds
 the other and starts the informational cascade process, addi
 tional sales have no further impact on future product adop
 tions, because sales under informational cascades are not
 influenced by users' own information, and therefore have no
 informational value (Golder and Tellis 2004; Oh and Jeon
 2007). This unique relationship between product ranking and
 product adoption distinguishes informational cascades from
 alternative explanations of herding phenomenon, such as
 network effects, WOM effects, or other mechanisms that link
 user valuation to product sales. These mechanisms often
 suggest that user adoption is a function of cumulative product
 sales. Since sales ranking is a variable derived from product
 sales, these mechanisms imply that sales ranking has no
 impact on product adoption after controlling for the influence
 of product sales. Informational cascades theory, however,
 indicates the opposite. It suggests that user adoptions change
 with the relative ranking of products, but not with the absolute
 number of product sales (i.e., the number of software
 downloads in our research context). We therefore propose
 HI: Online users' choice of software products exhibits
 significant jumps and drops with changes in download
 ranking of the product.
 Prior research on informational cascades theory considers
 individuals making adoption decisions between two products
 and notes that, once informational cascades start, individuals
 ignore their own private information to adopt the more
 popular product. The same principle applies in a multiproduct
 environment (Banerjee 1992; Bikhchandani et al. 1992;
 Chamley 2004). If individuals have the same preference, they
 will all choose to adopt the most popular product once
 informational cascades start. As a result, demand for the most
 popular product is expected to increase significantly while
 demand for all other products drops to zero. This winner
 takes-all scenario, however, rarely materializes in reality
 because preferences among individuals differ. For example,
 some users prefer software with greater functionality; some
 prefer ease-of-use, while others have no particular preference.
 Such residual heterogeneity (Welch 2000) leads to variations
 in product adoption, which prevent the most popular product
 from taking 100 percent of the market. To identify the impli
 cations of heterogeneity in consumer preference, we extend
 the previous example in HI. Consider a market with three
 products, A, and C.5 All the products are of the same price
 but different quality. Customers again have no ex ante infor
 mation about product quality. Besides differentiation on
 quality, the products differ in features that are observable to
 consumers. As customers have different preference for fea
 tures, they may consider only a subset of the products. Some
 may consider two of the three products; some may consider
 only one; others may consider all three. Given the presence
 of three products, there are seven types of consumers as listed
 in column 1 in Table 1. Now we analyze customer purchase
 decisions in an informational cascade. Without loss of
 generality, we assume that product ,4 is the most popular pro
 duct, product the second most popular product, and product
 C the least popular product. In an informational cascade,
 customers choose the most popular product within their own
 consideration set. As a result, the most popular product
 (product A) sees the biggest increase in demand as it attracts
 all customers except those with preference that explicitly
 excludes product^. Column 2 of Table 1 shows that four out
 of the seven types of customers will buy product A in an
 informational cascade. The number two product (product B)
 will see much less increase in adoption since it only attracts
 customers whose preference excludes the number one product
 (product A). Table 1 shows that only two of the seven types
 of customers will choose to buy product B. Product number
 three (product C) will see even less increase in adoption. In
 a market with three products, customers will purchase product
 C if and only if their preference explicitly excludes products
 A and B. This is clearly demonstrated in Table 1, where only
 5This example is adapted from Bikhchandani et al. (1998).
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 Table 1. Customer Type and Choice Set
 Customer Type











 one of the seven types of customers chooses product C. The
 above discussion suggests that residual heterogeneity in
 customer preference moderates the winner-take-all situation
 of informational cascades, yet we will continue to see that
 high ranking products receive the most benefits under infor
 mational cascades. We therefore propose
 H2: Changes in download ranking lead to jumps and drops
 of higher magnitude for high ranking products.
 Online User Reviews
 Besides leading to jumps and drops in product adoption,
 another key implication of informational cascades is that
 decision makers ignore their own information when they
 make adoption decisions under the influence of informa
 tional cascades (Bikhchandani et al. 1992). In our research
 context, a main information source for consumers is online
 user reviews submitted by fellow users.6 These reviews
 provide a glimpse of others' evaluations of the product and
 help later adopters to form their own decisions.
 The role of user reviews in influencing customer decision
 making has become an increasingly important topic for
 online businesses (Dellarocas 2003; Dellarocas et al. 2007),
 and we have seen a growing interest in understanding how
 these reviews influence users' adoption decisions. In spite
 of the widespread belief that the Internet may act as a huge
 "megaphone" in promoting product sales, we have found
 mixed evidence in the literature on how online user reviews
 in luence consumers' adoption decisions. Chevalier and
 Mayzlin (2006) showed a significant positive impact of
 online user reviews on relative online book sales for
 Amazon.com and BarnesandNoble.com. Chen et al. (2004)
 also used data from Amazon.com but attained different
 findings. Their results suggested that user ratings have no
 impact on sales. Pavlou and Dimoka (2006) took a more
 detailed look at the feedback comment text posted in eBay
 auctions. They noted that most users only read a very small
 portion of the feedback comments and the overall feedback
 score seems to be most influential. Their results indicate that
 the sentiment demonstrated in the comments has a close
 relationship with trust building, seller differentiation, and
 price premium.
 Informational cascades theory offers a potential explanation
 of the mixed results discovered in earlier studies. The theory
 suggests that the relationship between online user reviews
 and product adoption is more complicated than previously
 considered. Instead of assuming that online user reviews
 have a uniform impact across products, informational cas
 cades theory suggests that the impact is moderated by the
 level of informational cascades when users make adoption
 decisions. If a product is mainly adopted by users because
 of informational cascades, online user reviews have little
 impact on its sales. However, if a product is mainly adopted
 by users who apply their own information to make decisions,
 online user reviews can significantly influence product sales.
 The nature of informational cascades suggests that products
 mainly adopted out of informational cascades are popular
 products, while users who choose to adopt less popular pro
 ducts are more likely to be driven by their own information.
 This suggests the following pair of hypotheses to test the
 presence of informational cascades:
 6CNET also provides editor reviews on certain products. However, CNET
 editor reviews cover less than 10 percent of software programs. In addition,
 CNET tends to selectively review the most popular products, which limits
 the influence of CNET editor reviews given that the product is already
 established. Moreover, CNET reviews do not change once they are posted
 for a software program. For most of the software in our study, the CNET
 reviews were either posted before the study period or were never posted. In
 these cases, the impact of CNET reviews is captured by the time fixed
 effects as other time-constant variables in our empirical model. Therefore,
 we do not consider CNET reviews to have a major influence on product
 adoption.
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 H3: Online user ratings have no impact on online users '
 choice of popular products.
 H4: Online user ratings have an increasingly positive and
 significant impact on adoption of less popular products.
 Data ^K????KI???????????????????K????M
 Data Collection Methodology
 Data for this study were collected from CNET Download,
 com (CDNETD: http://www.download.com), which is part
 of the CNET networks. CNET networks provide reviews,
 news, and price information on technology products, as well
 as free software downloading and newsletters. CNETD is a
 library of over 30,000 free or free-to-try software programs
 for Windows, Macintosh, and handheld devices. Software
 programs are evaluated and categorized to facilitate user
 search. The list of available software programs can be sorted
 by total number or weekly number of downloads, software
 name, CNET rating, user rating, and the date added.
 Figure 2 shows the popularity of sort options used on
 CNETD listing pages, which has been published on the
 download.com webpage.7 Download counts appear to be the
 most popular sort option (37 percent), suggesting that users
 either are concerned with network effects or place significant
 weight on their predecessors' choices. CNET's editorial
 staff reviews some of the software programs, with an empha
 sis on popular software programs. Reviews are summarized
 by ratings on a scale of one to five, with one being the worst
 and five the best. CNETD also offers a widely used feed
 back system for online users to share their opinions and
 experiences. The user review system requests detailed
 comments, as well as an overall assessment indicated by a
 five-star user rating system.8
 Our sample consists of eight software categories, which
 provides a diversified composition of the software programs.
 We ensure that our data cover a wide range of categories of
 software programs by including popular software categories
 belonging to different types of applications. There are a total
 number of 15 groups of software programs listed on
 CNETD. Each group has from 8 to 22 categories. The cate
 gories we chose are the most popular software categories.
 As shown later (see Table 4), the eight categories represent
 close to 50 percent of the software in the most popular
 software list, indicating that they cover a large number of
 online user adoption decisions. We chose eight categories to
 make sure they are large enough to provide a diversified
 coverage, while small enough to be manageable for data
 collection. Table 2 provides a summary of the eight software
 categories. The number of software programs listed in each
 category varies considerably from approximately 60 to 300.
 Such a variation reflects the idiosyncratic environment in a
 specific software category, which can be defined as a single
 market. We started collecting data in each category daily in
 November 2004. Every day we extracted the following
 information on every software program listed in each
 category: software name, description, date added, total
 download, last week download, CNET rating, number of
 user reviews, average user rating, and whether the software
 program has been labeled as pop (software is designated as
 pop if it climbs onto the most popular list) and new (software
 is defined as new for the first 15 days). We also collected
 software characteristics including operating system require
 ments, file size, publisher, license, and price if its license is
 free-to-try. Table 3 presents the variable definition, descrip
 tion, and explanation of measurement.
 Key Variables
 The key dependent variable in our empirical analysis is
 online users' choice of software products. Although we do
 not observe each individual's behavior, we can measure user
 choice collectively by using weekly download market share
 for each product in each individual market (i.e., in a single
 software category). Using market share instead of number
 of downloads has two main advantages. First, it removes
 unobservable influences, such as weekend and holiday
 effects, which affect the absolute number of downloads.
 Second, it standardizes the variance across software pro
 ducts, further facilitating the empirical analysis.
 Our major independent variables include adoption decisions
 of recent predecessors and product information available
 online. The adoption decisions of recent predecessors are
 represented by download counts and download ranking,
 which highlights the popularity of the products in the market.
 CNETD prominently features this information through the
 sorting functions of download counts. Product information
 provided by CNETD includes user reviews and professional
 editor reviews in addition to software features. CNETD
 7When we were collecting data, this figure was posted by CNETD on its
 website in the section of general introduction on posting software programs
 on CNETD.
 CNETD originally used a binary (thumbs-up/thumbs-down) system for
 user reviews. At the end of January 2005, CNETD replaced the old system
 with the five-star user-rating system, keeping all other aspects of the
 interface the same. Since most of our data are collected in 2005, the
 analysis shown in this paper is of data using the current user review system.
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 Download User ratings CNET rating Date added Name
 counts
 Figure 2. Popularity of Sort Options on Download.com Listing Pages
 Table 2. Summary of the Software Categories
 Software Category  Daily Number of Software Programs Listed
 Adware and Spyware Removal  90-138
 Browsers  112-137
 Download Managers  113-127
 File Compression  59-83
 File Sharing  102-132
 Internet Chat  254 - 282
 Media Players  154-185
 MP3 Search Tools  73-123
 Note: Number of software is based on data from November 2004 to June 2005.
 Table 3. Description of Key Variables
 Variable  Description and Measure
 TOTALDOWNLOAD,  Cumulative total number of downloads of software / at time r (in millions)
 LASTWEEKDOWNLOAD, The most recent weekly number of downloads of software / at time t (in millions)
 WEEKLYRANK?  The rank of the most recent weekly number of downloads of software / at time t
 USERRATINGDu  A dummy variable measures if software / has user rating at time t
 Average user rating for software / at t (one to five scale with half points) USERRATING,
 CNETRA TINGDlf  A dummy variable measures if software / has CNET rating at time t
 CNETRATING,  CNET rating for software / (one-to-five scale)
 AGEif  Number of days that software / has been listed up to time t
 POPDif  A dummy variable measures if software / is labeled as popularat time t
 NEWDlf  A dummy variable measures if software / is labeled as new at time t
 NUMSOFTWAREt  Number of software listed in a specific category at time t
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 actively solicits user reviews for all products. CNETD also
 provides editor reviews for some software products (less than
 10 percent). These reviews are usually posted a few months
 after the introduction of the software program. More details
 on variables and model specification will be discussed in the
 methodology section.
 Descriptive Statistics
 We start our analysis with descriptive statistics of the most
 popular software programs and show that they are not
 necessarily the best-rated products. This provides the first
 glimpse of the potential consequence of the informational
 cascade effect. CNETD provides rankings for the most
 popular titles in Windows each week, which includes the top
 50 most-downloaded programs for the past week. We
 collected the most popular list each week from November
 2004 to June 2005. For each piece of software on the list,
 we collected the following information: software name,
 description, this week's rank, last week's rank, weeks on the
 top 50 chart, this week's download, and total download. By
 aggregating data from November 2004 to June 2005, we find
 106 unique entries of software programs that have appeared
 on the list. Table 4 shows the distribution of the software
 categories to which those 106 software programs belong.
 Table 5 presents the distributions of CNET ratings and user
 ratings for those 106 software programs. It shows that soft
 ware with mediocre or even low CNET and user ratings can
 still make the most-popular list. On a scale from one to five,
 12 (or 13 percent) software programs that make the list
 receive an average user rating below three. Similarly, eight
 (or 11 percent) have CNET ratings below three. Our
 analysis of the most popular software programs suggests that
 CNET and user reviews may not be the main driving force
 behind online users' adoption decisions.
 Another approach to assess the potential presence of
 informational cascades is to consider how software adoption
 changes with download ranking on a weekly basis. Figure 3
 is the plot for software "Bitcomet" that is one of the most
 popular software packages in the category "File Sharing."
 The plot demonstrates significant jumps of market share with
 the increase of download ranking from #3 to #2, and to #1.
 In addition, the figure shows that market share exhibits a
 higher jump when the download ranking changes from #2 to
 #1, compared with the increase from #3 to #2. This plot
 provides initial support for HI and H2 that users' product
 choices exhibit significant jumps and drops with changes in
 download ranking, and that the changes have more impact on
 the adoption of high ranking products. Figure 4 illustrates
 the relationship between download ranking and adoption for
 software "Star Downloader" that is listed in the category
 "Download Managers." It again shows significant jumps
 and drops in product adoption as the download ranking
 changes.
 The initial findings described in this section seem to support
 the informational cascades theory that online users may
 adopt software programs according to previous users'
 choices. To test the hypotheses and fully answer our research
 questions, we develop an empirical model and conduct
 rigorous empirical analysis in the next section of the paper.
 Empirical Methodology and Results
 Empirical Model
 Our major objective is to analyze the herd behavior in user
 adoption of software programs. We do not observe each
 user's download decision, but adoption decisions can be col
 lectively measured by download market share in each indi
 vidual market. We construct the measurement of market
 share for each individual software program, which reflects
 user adoption in a particular market. Let i = index the
 software in a specific market. DOWNLOADit is defined as
 the number of downloads of software / at time t. Hence, the




 We employ the multinomial logit (MNL) market-share
 models as our basis of empirical analysis to explain the
 market shares (choices) of different products. MNL market
 share models have been widely applied in marketing and
 economics to analyze the competitive structure and effects of
 advertisement and retail promotions (Cooper 1993). Since
 individual user choice underlies the process of market-share
 formation, the discussion of market-share models overlaps
 substantially with that of individual choice models
 (McFadden 1981). In addition, market-share models deal
 with market response over time as well as across competitors
 (Cooper 1993), which fits well with our situation. Following
 Nakanishi and Cooper (1974), the specification of the MNL
 market-share model is of the form
 = (ai-?)+Yi?k{xib-Xkl)+{?il-et) (2) k=\
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 Table 4. Distribution of the Most Popular Software Categories
 Most Popular Software Category  Software Count
 MP3 Search Tools  14
 Adware and Spyware Removal  13






 Others  44
 Total  106
 Note: Number of software is based on data from November 2004 to June 2005.
 Table 5. Distributions of the CNET and User Ratings of Most Popular Software Programs
 Rating
 Frequency
 User Rating Count  CNET Rating Count
 User Rating Count
 With No CNET Rating
 1-2  5 (5%)  1 (1%)  2 (5%;
 2-3  7 (8%)  7(10%)  2 (5%)
 3-4  45 (49%)  26 (38%)  18(48%)
 4-5  35 (38%)  35 (51%)  8 (22%)
 Total  92  69  37
 Note: For both user and CNET ratings, the scale is from 1-5 with "1" = worst and "5" = best. There are 14 software programs that have not been
 rated by users, 37 not rated by CNET, and 7 that have neither user nor CNET ratings.
 where Sit is the market share of the zth product in a market of
 /products at time t, a^s a parameter for the intrinsic value of
 product i, and Xikt is the value of kth exploratory variable,
 which may influence users' product choices, and eit is the
 error term. St is the geometric mean of Sit, and CC, Xkt, and St
 are the arithmetic means of aif Xik0 and eit, respectively.
 To apply the equation to our context, we need to first define
 markets. CNETD carries a large number of software pro
 grams that belong to many different categories, and these
 categories are mostly unrelated to each other. For instance, a
 user's choice of MP3 search software is independent from her
 choice of online chat software. Software programs within the
 same category, however, provide similar functionality and
 compete for the same group of users. We therefore treat each
 software category as an independent market and fit Equation
 (2) to each category separately. Technically, our estimation
 model is
 =fo-^)+Z?,c(4 -^,c)+k -^,c) (3)
 where C denotes a particular software category, and the
 coefficients of the estimations are allowed to vary across
 different categories of software products. We note that we
 can rewrite the first term {pc? ~(X?) in Equation (3) as &i,
 which is just software-specific fixed effects. We also note
 that ?t,c can be captured by time fixed effects at c, which vary
 across time periods for each software category, thus fully
 capturing the variation of any category time-varying
 variables. The above discussion suggests that we can rewrite
 Equation (3) as a linear estimation model
 \S',cJ
 = < + ?,,c+??,c(4-4,c) + ^ (4) k=l
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 Note: "Bitcomet" is the software to share and download files from BitTorrent and chat with friends. This software is listed under 'File
 Sharing" on CNETD.
 Figure 3. Weekly Rank and Weekly Market Share for Software "Bitcomet"
 Note: "Star Downloader" is the software to split files into several parts and download them simultaneously. This software is listed under
 "Download Managers" on CNETD.
 Figure 4. Weekly Rank and Weekly Market Share for Software "Star Downloader"
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 By stacking the software products data together in one
 category from different time periods, we construct a set of
 panel data to estimate Equation (4). Our panel data consist of
 weekly observations of software downloading and product
 information. Panel data can be used to obtain consistent esti
 mators in the presence of unobserved variables (Wooldridge
 2002). Equation (4) includes the software-specific fixed
 effects to capture the idiosyncratic and time-constant unob
 served characteristics associated with each piece of software.
 The advantage of fixed effects estimation is that it controls for
 intrinsic software characteristics, which inherently affect
 market share. In addition, fixed effects estimation also allows
 the error term eit to be arbitrarily correlated with other
 explanatory variables, thus making the estimation results
 more robust. Equation (4) also includes the time-specific
 fixed effects that capture any influence on market share due
 to timing differences in each category.
 To test HI, we include variable WEEKLYRANK^, which
 measures the most recent weekly download ranking of soft
 ware i at time t. The coefficient represents the jump in adop
 tions a product experiences for each advance in product
 ranking. Note that if a higher ranking corresponds to a lower
 value in WEEKLYRANKiul, the coefficient is expected to be
 negative (i.e., each retreat in product ranking leads to a drop
 in software adoption). To test whether the magnitude of
 jumps varies for products in different rank positions (H2), we
 add the square term of WEEKLYRANKiul (WEEKLY
 RANKSQiul ). H2 indicates that product adoption is a de
 creasing and convex function of product ranking. A ranking
 decrease for higher ranking products (e.g., a decrease from # 1
 to #2) leads to a deeper drop in product adoption than for
 lower ranking products (e.g., a decrease from #4 to #5). The
 coefficient of the quadratic term is therefore expected to be
 positive. We note that a minor linear transformation of the
 rank variable and the square term could make the coefficients
 more intuitive.9 Instead of including WEEKLYRANKi ul and
 WEEKL YRANKSQit_h we consider (WEEKL YRANK,u_rl) and
 its square term. For parsimony, we name the new variables
 WEEKL Y RA NK_ Iiul and WEEKL YRA NK_ lSQitt.?,
 respectively. The transformation makes the coefficient on
 WEEKLYRANK_liul representing the impact of rank change
 on the most popular product and the coefficient on
 WEEKLYRANK_lSQit.? measuring how the impact varies for
 lower ranking products relative to the most popular product.
 To testi/3 and#4, we introduce the USERRATING iM and its
 interaction with product ranking WEEKLYRANKitA\
 WEEKL YRANK*USERRA TING. Again, to present our results
 in the more intuitive way, we use WEEKLYRANK1it_? in
 place of WEEKLYRANKiul for the interaction term
 (WEEKLYRANK1 *USERRATING). The transformation
 again makes all of the coefficients relative to the most popular
 product (rank #1). The coefficient on USERRATINGi ul mea
 sures the influence of use reviews on user adoption of the
 most popular (rank #1) product, and the coefficient on the
 interaction term represents how the impact of online user
 reviews is moderated by informational cascades for lower
 ranking products relative to the most popular (rank #1)
 product. Informational cascades theory suggests that decision
 makers ignore information in adopting popular products. We,
 therefore, expect the coefficient on USERRATINGiul to be
 insignificant. Informational cascades are less likely to happen
 for less popular products, so the influence of user rating
 should increase for the lower ranking products. Thus, we
 expect the coefficient of the interaction term to be positive,
 which suggests that online user reviews have a significantly
 positive impact on less popular products. As a control, we
 include USERRATINGDi t_h which specifies whether product
 / has received any user reviews. We also include
 CNETRA TINGDit,j to indicate whether this product has
 received a CNET professional review.10
 Informational Cascades, Network Effects,
 WOM, and Product Diffusion
 To identify informational cascades, we need to control for
 other factors that influence online users' adoption decisions.
 As we mentioned earlier, many software products are
 expected to be subject to network effects (Gallaugher and
 Wang 2002; Kauffman et al. 2000), which also suggests that
 online users' adoption decisions are influenced by others'
 adoption decisions. The two effects need to be separated in
 order to identify the true influence of informational cascades.
 Moreover, prior studies on WOM and product diffusion also
 suggest alternative ways that product adoption decisions can
 be influenced by others' actions. The WOM literature indi
 cates that exposure to WOM online and offline could signifi
 cantly influence consumers' product adoption decisions
 (Godes and Mayzlin 2004). The product diffusion literature
 (e.g., Bass 1969) finds that consumer adoption is influenced
 by a product's current user base and the number of its poten
 10We have tested alternative specifications by including the interaction term
 of CNET rating and download ranking to investigate whether the influence
 of CNET rating is moderated by informational cascades. We did not find any
 significant results, which indicate that in our research context, the editor's
 rating has no significant impact. Please see footnote 6 for a detailed explana
 tion on the nature of CNET rating and our modeling approach.
 9Please see Appendix A for a more detailed explanation of the trans
 formation.
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 tial users. As its user base expands, the adoption rate among
 potential users increases. In the following sections, we
 discuss how to separate informational cascades from network
 effect, WOM effects, and product diffusion.
 Control for Network Effects and WOM Effects
 While both network effects and informational cascades indi
 cate that adoption decisions are influenced by earlier adopters,
 there is a key difference between the two processes. Network
 effects indicate that the value of a product increases with the
 network size. In the context of software products, it means
 the value of a software package increases with the total
 number of its users. Informational cascades, on the other
 hand, are information based. Informational cascades start
 when one product's popularity exceeds another and the
 information inferred from such popularity ranking outweighs
 the individual's own information. Different from network
 effects, increases in number of users have no impact on infor
 mational cascades if the increases do not change relative
 popularity between products. This is a crucial distinction
 between informational cascades and network effects.
 Extant literature models network effects by assuming the
 adoption rate or the expected value of the software products
 increases with the size of a product's installed base (Bryn
 jolfsson and Kemerer 1996). Previous research often uses the
 total number of the installed base to estimate the network
 effects (Brynjolfsson and Kemerer 1996; Gallaugher and
 Wang 2002). Following the same convention, we include
 variable TOTALDOWNLOAD it_h which measures the cumula
 tive number of downloads of software / until time t-1, to
 control for the network effects on user software choices.
 WOM communication is also often attributed as a leading
 cause for herd behavior (Bikhchandani et al. 1992; Li 2004).
 Extant innovation diffusion and information economics re
 search suggests that WOM learning can significantly influ
 ence technology adoption and diffusion (Dellarocas et al.
 2007; Li 2004). WOM is often associated with recent adop
 tions (Elberse and Eliashberg 2003). Higher number of adop
 tions indicates that more awareness of the product will be es
 tablished through users who have adopted the product. In our
 context, we use the most recent weekly number of downloads
 {LASTWEEKDO WNLOADit) to control for the WOM effect.
 Control for Product Diffusion
 There are two diffusion processes for software downloads.
 First, a newly introduced software category, such as MP3
 players, may gradually gain popularity among online users.
 To control for product diffusion at the category level, we use
 market share instead of the absolute number of downloads as
 the dependent variable. The market share model is not
 affected by the overall expansion or contraction of a product
 category, which eliminates the need to model diffusion at the
 category level. Second, within each category, individual
 software programs have their own diffusion processes. The
 product diffusion literature suggests that the level of adoption
 for each software product is influenced by a product's current
 user base and the number of its potential users. The larger the
 user base, the higher the adoption rate among potential users.
 This assumption is mathematically identical to the implication
 from the network effects theory. However, product diffusion
 theory also indicates that increases in user base carry a trade
 off. With more and more users adopting the product, the
 number of potential users decreases. Consequently, the mar
 ket share of new adoptions decreases as the product starts to
 saturate the market. This is an effect that we need to control
 for in assessing the true impact of informational cascades in
 the market. To control for this effect, we incorporate the Bass
 Diffusion Model into Equation (4).
 The Bass Diffusion Model (Bass 1969) has been widely used
 in marketing (Mahajan et al. 2000) and economics (Berndt et
 al. 2003) for modeling new product diffusion. The basic Bass
 Diffusion Model indicates that product adoption at any given
 point is influenced by the current user base of a product and
 by potential users who have not adopted the product. The
 expression of Bass Diffusion Model of the number of new
 adopters at time t (Mahajan et al. 1993, p. 354) is
 In the above equation, mi represents the total market potential
 for product /; t denotes the age of the product since its first
 introduction;pi stands for online users' inherent adoption rate
 to download the software; q? represents the increase in the
 adoption rate due to the increase in the user base.
 Converting Equation (5) into the log market share is straight
 forward.
 Pi(Pi+qi)2eA  (5)
 lg^7T = lg^-IgPt +21g(# +q?) n(t)
 (6)
 { ^- \+*? \-l?n(t) V Pi
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 Then, applying the Taylor series to Equation (6)," we have:
 Ig^^g^-lg/^lgfo+tf,) n{t)
 -{pi+qi)t-?e^,)' -\gn{t) Pi
 (7)
 The first three items of the above equation are unique to each
 product and will be captured by product fixed effects. The
 last item represents the total number of downloads for the
 product category at time /, which will be captured by time
 fixed effects. The two items in the middle suggest that the log
 market share of a product depends on the age of the product
 and that the relationship contains both linear and nonlinear
 components. To facilitate linear regression, we use the
 conventional quadratic term to approximate the nonlinear
 component. That means we can add product age (AGEit) and
 the quadratic term of product age (AGESQit) into the empirical
 model to control for product diffusion. Prior research shows
 that individual products often diffuse at different speeds, with
 some reaching market saturation faster than others (Mahajan
 et al. 2000). To model the differences in diffusion processes,
 ideally we need to allow coefficients on both AGEit and
 AGESQit to vary across products. However, this approach
 does not provide enough degrees of freedom for our empirical
 analysis. Thus, we take a compromising approach that allows
 the coefficient on AGEit to vary across products but keeps the
 coefficient on AGESQit fixed for products in the same
 category. Our approach essentially assumes that each soft
 ware program may diffuse at a different speed, but the shape
 of the diffusion process is the same across all software pack
 ages in the same category. We consider this to be a reason
 able compromise, as it captures the first-order differences in
 diffusion processes while maintaining enough degrees of
 freedom for our analysis.
 In addition to network effects, WOM effects, and product
 diffusion, other factors may be correlated with online user
 adoption of a software program. We control for these factors
 by including a dummy variable POPDit that indicates whether
 software / is labeled as pop at time t\ NEWDit that specifies
 whether software / is labeled as new at time since users may
 be more interested in new software programs; and
 NUMSOFTWAREit that is the total number of software pro
 grams listed in this category at time t to control for the
 competition in a particular software category t.
 Panel Data Fixed Effects Estimation Results
 We estimate our empirical model using the panel data of
 weekly observations. We use weekly data because it covers
 longer time periods and many of our key variables are up
 dated weekly.12 We construct the unbalanced panel data for
 the eight software categories during the time period between
 February 2005 and June 2005.13 Table 6 shows the descrip
 tive statistics of the key variables. Notice that the weekly
 market share can be as high as 75 percent and as low as
 almost zero, indicating market dominance by a small number
 of software programs. The high discrepancy in weekly mar
 ket share illustrates users' preferences for popular software
 programs, suggesting the existence of herding. Table 7
 presents the correlation matrix for the pooled weekly data of
 the eight software categories.
 The fixed effects panel data estimation results are shown in
 Table 8 with centered lg WEEKL YSHAREit as the dependent
 variable. The coefficient on WEEKLYRANK_IitA is signifi
 cantly negative across all eight categories. As we mentioned
 earlier, this coefficient measures the marginal impact of rank
 changes on the most popular product. The negative coeffi
 cient supports hypothesis HI, indicating that user adoptions
 see a significant jump when a product's relative ranking
 changes from second place to first in popularity. H2 is also
 strongly supported in all but one product category (File
 Compression) with a significantly positive coefficient of
 WEEKRANK_lSQi t_j, indicating that higher ranking products
 will see a greater increase in adoption as a result of an
 increase in download ranking. The coefficient on
 USERRATINGiul has no consistent significant impact across
 the eight categories. As we mentioned earlier, the coefficient
 on USERRATING it_? measures the influence of user rating on
 the adoption of the most popular product (rank #1). The
 insignificance of the coefficient supports informational
 cascades theory that users ignore product information when
 they follow others to adopt the most popular product (H3).
 We find significantly positive coefficients of
 WEEKLYRANK I *USERRA TING in all eight categories.
 This suggests that the influence of online user reviews is
 moderated by informational cascades. User reviews have no
 impact for popular products, but have significant influence on
 users' choice for less popular products, supporting H4. The
 results also show that TOTALDOWNLOADz>; is significantly
 12We also test our model using daily observations at different time periods,
 which generates qualitatively similar results; the report is available upon
 request.
 13CNETD changed its user review system in late January 2005. To make
 sure our results are not affected by this change, we restrict our data analysis
 to data collected after that change.
 1 lrrhe Taylor series approximation is valid when /? ? + ,)' ? qt, which can
 be readily satisfied when / increases. We estimate the model for samples
 encompassing different time periods and have obtained qualitatively similar
 results.
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 Table 6. Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables
 Variable  Mean  Median  S. D.  Min.
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 Table 6. Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables (Continued)
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 Table 7. Correlation Matrix of Key Variables
 Variable  10
 Adware & Spyware Removal
 1. Ig WEE KL YS HARE?t
 2 WEEKL YRANKj^
 3 TOTALDOWNLOAD/M
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 Table 7. Correlation Matrix of Key Variables (Continued)
 Variable  10
 File Sharing
 Ig WE E KL YS HA REjt
 WEEKLYRANK^
 TOTALDOWNLOADi>M
 LA S TWEEKDOWNL OADit
 POPDit
 NEWDit
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 AG Eit  coefficients on AGEit are estimated for each individual product
 = 1479
 Group = 98
 R2 = 0.50
 = 2085
 Group =110
 R2 = 0.43
 = 1903
 Group = 125
 R2 = 0.45
 = 1123
 Group = 59
 R2 = 0.34
 = 2078
 Group = 126
 R2 = 0.42
 =4218
 Group = 263
 R2 = 0.55
 = 2794
 Group = 191
 R2 = 0.30
 Note: ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10; standard errors in parentheses.
 Software dummies (fixed effects for each software) and time dummies (fixed effects for each week) used in estimating the model are not reported.
 nificantly positive for Internet Chat, but has no impact for
 other categories, which is consistent with our expectation that
 software programs in Internet Chat have strong network
 effects. We also note the significant positive coefficient of
 LASTWEEKDO JVNLOADip suggesting the potential influence
 of WOM and informational value contained in the recent
 week's downloads. Furthermore, we note that the variable
 POPDit has significant positive relationships with the market
 share for all eight categories, which complement our test of
 informational cascades using weekly rank.
 Recent econometrics development work suggests that panel
 data often involve time series features that have not been
 considered in traditional estimation techniques (Wooldridge
 2002). Particularly in our study, the weekly data may be
 autocorrelated. To ensure the robustness of our results, we
 incorporate the time series feature into our panel data model.
 Assuming a time series process with autocorrelation residuals,
 we estimate our panel data using a fixed-effects technique
 with autocorrelated disturbances. We also test alternative
 specifications such as estimating the model weighted by the
 number of user reviews, and estimating the model under
 heteroskedasticity robust errors. In all of the cases discussed
 above, the fixed-effects estimation gives qualitatively similar
 results. We thus omit the detailed statistics report here.
 Discussion, Limitations, and
 Future Research l^^^^H
 In this study, we provide a systematic analysis of informa
 tional cascades by empirically investigating two sets of
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 unique characteristics of informational cascades, namely, the
 impact of changes in ranking on product adoption and the lack
 of impact of product reviews on the adoption of popular
 products. We conduct our analysis in the context of online
 software downloading that illustrates the overwhelming
 amount of choices available in today's online market and the
 extent to which online users have access to others' adoption
 decisions and product review information. While the soft
 ware downloading market potentially represents an extreme
 case of information overload and limited product knowledge,
 its key characteristics are shared by many other e-commerce
 sites. For example, Amazon.com lists 3,285 cameras in the
 category of "Point-and-Shoot Digital Cameras," a choice set
 that is daunting to even the most sophisticated shoppers. To
 assist online users' purchase decisions, Amazon.com provides
 a variety of sales ranking data, product information, and user
 reviews. Moreover, Amazon.com features top seller lists
 prominently on the category home page and updates the list
 hourly as a main vehicle to attract shoppers' attention.
 Similar approaches have been adopted by other major online
 retailers. A quick survey shows that online stores ranging
 from Buy.com to iTunes.com provide others' adoption
 decisions to facilitate users' purchase decisions, and most of
 the online retailers prominently feature the best-selling pro
 ducts on their homepages. Our analysis of the software
 downloading market provides us with a detailed under
 standing of how information about others' adoption decisions
 could influence subsequent adopters' decisions in the online
 markets and how it moderates the influence of online product
 information and user reviews.
 By analyzing our panel data using a fixed-effects market
 share model, our results reveal that online users' choice of
 software is heavily driven by change in download ranking and
 popularity information after controlling for download counts
 and product review information. Our findings are consistent
 with the predictions of the informational cascades literature
 that individuals are remarkably influenced by the information
 inferred from others' behavior.
 Our results also shed light on the intriguing relationship
 between product information and informational cascades. We
 find that online user ratings have no impact on online users'
 choice of popular products, whereas ratings have a significant
 positive impact on the adoption of less popular products. This
 is again consistent with the informational cascades literature,
 which suggests that consumers ignore product information
 during informational cascades in adopting popular products.
 Our result also suggests a complicated relationship between
 online user reviews and product adoption decisions, which
 has not been addressed in previous literature and calls for
 extensions in future research.
 In addition, our analysis separates informational cascades
 from network effects that often affect software adoption deci
 sions (Brynjolfsson and Kemerer 1996). Both network effects
 and informational cascades lead to herd behavior, although
 the underlying causes of herding are different. Under network
 effects, user adoptions increase with increases in the overall
 installed user base of the software. Under informational cas
 cades, user adoptions are driven by changes in relative
 ranking between products. We separate these two effects in
 this study by including user adoption to capture the network
 effects and relative ranking to capture the informational cas
 cades effect. We find that network effects exist for certain
 products that can generate direct external benefits, while
 informational cascades have significant and consistent influ
 ence across all products. Previous IS research often attributes
 observed herd behavior to network effects without consid
 ering informational cascades, and thus might overstate the
 significance of network effects. Our analysis indicates that,
 while informational cascading is less known, it exerts a ubiq
 uitous and dominant impact on a user's adoption decision.
 While our analysis focuses primarily on user adoption of
 consumer-oriented products, it has implications for corporate
 IT adoption as well. Prior studies have indicated that infor
 mational cascades theory could be applied to the corporate IT
 adoption environment (Kauffman and Li 2003; Li 2004;
 Terlaak and King 2006). These studies consistently found
 that IT managers are more likely to adopt popular information
 systems, and one of the drivers of the phenomenon is infor
 mational cascades. Given the high stakes involved and the
 earlier findings that IT managers are influenced by infor
 mational cascades, our results suggest that a corporation can
 mitigate the situation by providing more information to IT
 decision makers. This could involve providing better training,
 providing access to professional product research reports,
 and/or hiring better IT managers who have extensive product
 and industry knowledge.
 This paper has a number of limitations. To facilitate discus
 sion, we provide in Appendix a list of assumptions used in
 the paper, their impact on the paper, and possible future
 research directions to address these assumptions. First, in this
 study, we only consider the product information users can
 observe on CNETD, without addressing other available infor
 mation resources, such as other third-party review sites, soft
 ware magazines, and word-of-mouth from family and friends.
 While CNETD is the dominant software downloading site and
 often the only online information source for software
 products, it is known that WOM from trusted friends and
 family members can be an important source of information for
 online users. Incomplete information about users' informa
 tion sources reduces the accuracy of analysis. Future research
 44 MIS Quarterly Vol. 33 No. 1/March 2009
This content downloaded from 
            73.119.119.135 on Fri, 29 Jan 2021 17:00:35 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Duan et al ./Informational Cascades & Software Adoption
 is necessary to examine the influence of multiple information
 resources and the limitation of information provided by a
 firm's own site. In addition, we implicitly assume that online
 users pay attention to sales ranking information, online
 product information, and user reviews in our model. We do
 not know, however, whether they really do or how differences
 in websites influence their interests and use of such informa
 tion. A survey of online users with regard to their information
 may allow future research to generate a better understanding
 of the impact of online product information.
 Second, the use of free or free-to-try products may affect the
 generalizability of our results. Online users may take deci
 sions about free or free-to-try software programs less
 seriously compared to decisions about more expensive
 technical innovations. We investigate this issue and find that
 free or free-to-try software programs often require significant
 commitments from the users. For example, MP3 software is
 often used to manage music files, and the users need to input
 extensive information about these music files and put in
 significant effort to process these files. The time and effort
 spent will be wasted if the user later decides to remove the
 program. Similarly, Chat software often requires a user to set
 up a new account, import the contact list, and inform friends
 of the transition to the new program. If the user decides to
 abandon the program later, another messy transition would be
 expected. In addition, many programs require users to learn
 new interfaces and explore new functionality. All of these
 efforts required of software users represent a significant cost
 for using the programs. From this perspective, free-to-down
 load software programs are not substantially different from
 other products that online users have to purchase.
 Third, our empirical analysis cannot fully distinguish rational
 and irrational herding. Herding that arises from informational
 cascades is rational in the sense that decision makers incor
 porate their predecessors' actions into their own decision
 making process. Informational cascades occur when the deci
 sions of others are strong enough to outweigh an individual
 decision makers' private information. However, the same
 type of herd behavior can also be generated from totally
 irrational behavior when decision makers just ignore the
 information available to them. Interestingly, our results pro
 vide some hints that the observed herd behavior is likely to be
 the result of the rational herding. Our results suggest that
 consumers pay more attention in adoption of less popular
 products, suggesting certain rationality in the decision-making
 process. Separating rational and irrational herd behavior is
 certainly an interesting extension to this study.
 Fourth, this study characterizes how informational cascades
 moderate the influence of product information on online user
 choices. In the process, we assume product information and
 user reviews as given. In reality, product information from
 user reviews is generated by users themselves. This informa
 tion generation process is dynamic as online users influence
 each other in forming opinions about a product. Recent
 research has shown that online users could be subject to both
 persuasion biases and extremism in that they are more likely
 to post reviews if they feel strongly (positively or negatively)
 about a product (Dellarocas and Narayan 2006; Hu et al.
 2006). Li and Hitt (2008) found that another mechanism,
 self-selection, may produce biased user ratings as well. How
 ever, we do not know the causes of the divergence and how
 they affect the informational cascades process. Future
 research targeting the dynamics of user reviews and their
 interaction with informational cascades would be fruitful.
 Fifth, we consider network effects and informational cascades
 as two distinct mechanisms that lead to herd behavior.
 However, informational cascades and positive network effects
 may complement each other in various situations. For a
 product with positive network effects, the herding observed
 due to informational cascades will be further accelerated by
 network effects, resulting in more followers adopting the
 product. Therefore, for products with positive network
 effects, it is even more important to take up the market in the
 early stages in order to fully leverage the influence of infor
 mational cascades. An extension to the current research
 would be valuable to examine the complementarities between
 informational cascades and network effects in influencing the
 product adoption and diffusion process.
 Finally, we make a few assumptions in deriving the empirical
 model. For example, in our effort to control for product
 diffusion, we assume the shape of the diffusion curve to be
 the same across different products, although we allow diffu
 sion speed to vary. We also choose a particular way to
 incorporate the Bass Diffusion Model into the regression
 model to maintain its linear structure. The choice of a linear
 estimation model facilitates estimation of key coefficients.
 However, it sacrifices some of the richness of the diffusion
 model. Future research may benefit from using nonlinear
 models for a better control of product diffusion.
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 Appendix A
 Transformation of the Weekly Rank Variable and the Interpretation MB
 To test HI and H2, we include the most recent weekly download ranking of software i at time t: WEEKLYRANKitA and its quadratic term
 WEEKL YRANKSQi t_j. Instead of including WEEKL YRANKiM and WEEKL YRANKSQit.h we consider ( WEEKL YRANKitl-1 ) and its square
 term. That is, we transformed the original rank (7,2, 3... ) to (0,1, 2... ). The simple linear transformation does not change the regression model,
 yet makes the interpretation of the coefficients easier and more intuitive. Given the transformation, the impact of weekly ranking on product
 sales can be expressed as follows: ? ?(WEEKLYRANK^ - 1) + ?2(WEEKLYRANKit_1 - l)2. The first derivative of the expression shows that
 the marginal influence of change in weekly rank is /?;+ 2?2(WEEKL YRANKit_j - 1). This gives an intuitive explanation of coefficient /?? which
 stands for the marginal influence of rank changes for the most popular product (rank #1), when the second term of the equation
 ( WEEKLYRANKi t_j - 1) - 0.
 To test H3 and H4, we introduce the USERRATING\M and its interaction with product ranking WEEKLYRANK?ul:
 WEEKLYRANK*USERRATING. Similar to above, to present our results in the most understandable way, we use WEEKLYRANKJwhich
 equals to ( WEEKL YRANKit_j -1) in place of WEEKL YRANKit.j for the interaction term (WEEKLYRANKJ *USERRA TING). That is, the impact
 of user rating on product adoption can be expressed as ?3 USERRA TINGit.} + ?4( WEEKL YRANKit_? - 1)USERRA TINGit.j. The expression allows
 the influence of user ratings to vary with product ranking. The first derivative of the expression relative to USERRATINGi ul shows that the
 marginal influence of user rating is ?3 + ?4{ WEEKLYRANKiM - ). For the most popular product (rank #1 ), the influence of user rating is simply
 ?3, given (WEEKLYRANKiul - 1) = 0. That is, the transformation allows the coefficient on USERRATING it_} to measure the influence of use
 reviews on adoption of the most popular (rank #1) product, and the coefficient on the interaction term represents how the impact of online user
 reviews is moderated by informational cascades for lower ranking products relative to the most popular product.
 Appendix
 Summary of Key Assumptions, Limitations, and Future Research
 Assumption  Limitation  Future Research
 1. Online users pay attention to the infor
 mation presented on CNETD, and adop
 tion decisions are mainly driven by infor
 mation on CNETD.
 We do not observe online users' information
 collection and usage process. In addition,
 online users may also get information from
 their friends and other popular press sources.
 To survey online users with regard to their
 information usage and examine the influ
 ence of multiple resources.
 2. User adoption of free-to-try software is
 similar to their purchase behavior of other
 online products.
 Users need to incur significant learning costs
 and switching costs to adopt a software
 product. From this perspective, learning
 costs are the price users pay for the software.
 However, users may respond differently to
 prices versus costs of adoption.
 To consider herd behavior in other contexts
 where price is a factor for consideration.
 3. Herd behavior tested is caused by a
 rational informational cascading process.
 Rational and irrational herding can both
 occur, which may lead to similar outcomes.
 To differentiate rational and irrational
 herding
 4. Product review information is taken as
 exogenous.
 Product reviews, especially online user
 reviews, are dynamic.
 To explicitly incorporate the dynamics of
 online user reviews and its influence into the
 product diffusion process
 5. Informational cascades and network
 effects are two separate mechanisms that
 lead to herd behavior.
 There may exist significant complementarities
 between informational cascades and network
 effects.
 To model complementarities between
 informational cascades and network effects.
 6. The shape of the diffusion process is
 the same across all software products.
 Bass Diffusion Model is incorporated into
 the empirical model in a log linear form.
 Details of Bass diffusion model, such as
 differences in diffusion shapes, are lost.
 To relax the assumption on parameter and
 distribution specifications of the product
 diffusion process, potentially with a
 nonlinear model.
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